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Abstract
Adversarial examples are important for under-
standing the behavior of neural models, and
can improve their robustness through adver-
sarial training. Recent work in natural lan-
guage processing generated adversarial exam-
ples by assuming white-box access to the at-
tacked model, and optimizing the input di-
rectly against it (Ebrahimi et al., 2018). In this
work, we show that the knowledge implicit
in the optimization procedure can be distilled
into another more efficient neural network. We
train a model to emulate the behavior of a
white-box attack and show that it generalizes
well across examples. Moreover, it reduces
adversarial example generation time by 19x-
39x. We also show that our approach trans-
fers to a black-box setting, by attacking The
Google Perspective API and exposing its vul-
nerability. Our attack flips the API-predicted
label in 42% of the generated examples, while
humans maintain high-accuracy in predicting
the gold label.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
have gained tremendous attention recently, as they
elucidate model limitations, and expose vulner-
abilities in deployed systems. Work in natural
language processing (NLP) either (a) used simple
heuristics for generating adversarial examples (Jia
and Liang, 2017; Belinkov and Bisk, 2017; Iyyer
et al., 2018), or (b) assumed white-box access,
where the attacker has access to gradients of the
model with respect to the input (Feng et al., 2018;
Ebrahimi et al., 2018). In this approach, adversar-
ial examples are constructed through an optimiza-
tion process that uses gradient descent to search
for input examples that maximally change the pre-
dictions of a model. However, developing attacks
with only black-box access to a model (no access
to gradients) is still under-explored in NLP.
∗ Equal contribution
Figure 1: (A) Using a white-box attack we generate adver-
sarial examples for a source toxicity model S(·). We train
our black-box attacker, DISTFLIP, to emulate the white-box
attack. (B) We use DISTFLIP to attack a black-box model.
Inspired by work in computer vision (Papernot
et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017), we show in this
work that a neural network can learn to emulate
the optimization process of a white-box attack and
generalize well to new examples. Figure 1 gives
a high-level overview of our approach. We as-
sume a text classification model and a white-box
attack that flips characters in the input to mod-
ify the model prediction (Ebrahimi et al., 2018).
We generate output adversarial examples using the
white-box attack and train a neural network from
these input-output examples to imitate the white-
box attack. This results in a much more efficient
attack whose run-time is independent of the opti-
mization process. Moreover, assuming adversarial
examples transfer between different models, our
distilled model can now be used to generate ad-
versarial examples for black-box attacks directly.
We use our approach to attack a toxicity clas-
sifier, aimed at detecting toxic language on social
media (Hosseini et al., 2017). We show that our
model achieves a speed-up of 19x-39x in generat-
ing adversarial examples while maintaining sim-
ilar attack quality, compared to an optimization-
based method. We then use our model for a black-
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box attack against Google Perspective API for de-
tecting toxic sentences, and find that 42% of our
generated sentences are misclassified by the API,
while humans agree that the sentences are toxic.
Our code can be downloaded from http://
github.com/orgoro/white-2-black.
2 Background
Adversarial examples have been extensively used
recently in NLP for probing and understanding
neural models (Jia and Liang, 2017; Weber et al.,
2018). Methods for generating such examples in-
clude adding random or heuristically constructed
noise (Belinkov and Bisk, 2017; Rodriguez and
Rojas-Galeano, 2018; Gao et al., 2018), meaning-
preserving modifications that change the surface
form (Iyyer et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2018),
and human-in-the-loop generation (Wallace et al.,
2018). A weakness of such models is that they
do not directly try to modify the prediction of a
model, which can reduce efficacy (Kurakin et al.,
2016). In the white-box setting, Feng et al. (2018)
have changed the meaning of an input without
changing model output using access to gradients,
and Ebrahimi et al. (2018) proposed HOTFLIP, the
aforementioned white-box attack that we emulate
for flipping input characters.
In computer vision, Papernot et al. (2016) and
Liu et al. (2017) have shown that adversarial ex-
amples generated by a white-box model can be
helpful for a black-box attack. Generating adver-
sarial text examples is more challenging than ad-
versarial images, because images are points in a
continuous space, and thus it is easier to apply
norm restrictions. Text examples have a discrete
structure and thus such approaches have not been
investigated for adversarial text generation yet.
3 HOTFLIP
HOTFLIP (Ebrahimi et al., 2018) is a white-box
method for generating adversarial examples for a
character-level neural model. It uses the gradient
with respect to a 1-hot input representation to esti-
mate the character flip that incurs the highest cost.
We briefly describe HOTFLIP, which we use to
generate training examples for our distilled model.
Let x = ((x11, . . . , x
n
1 ), . . . , (x
1
m, . . . , x
n
m)) be a
sentence represented as a sequence of m charac-
ters, encoded as 1-hot vectors over a vocabulary
of size n. Define L(x, y) to be the loss of a trained
model for the input x with respect to a label y.
HOTFLIP requires one function evaluation
(forward pass) and one gradient computation
(backward pass) to compute a first-order es-
timate of the best possible character flip in
x. Flipping the ith character from a to b
can be represented by this vector: −→vib =
(. . . , (0, . . . ,−1, . . . , 1, . . . , 0)i, . . . ), where −1
and 1 are in the positions for the ath and bth
characters respectively. A first-order estimate of
the change in loss can be obtained by computing
∇xL(x, y) with back-propagation, and taking a di-
rectional derivative along −→vib :
∇−→vibL(x, y) = ∇xL(x, y) ·
−→vib .
We can now choose the character-flip a to b that
maximizes this estimate using the gradients with
respect to the input x:
arg max
i,b
[∇L(x, y) · −→vib ] = arg max
i,b
[
∂L
∂xbi
− ∂L
∂xai
].
To perform a sequence of flips, any search proce-
dure can be applied. HOTFLIP uses beam search
of r steps, keeping at each step the top-K flip
sequences that increased L(x, y) the most. This
require O(K · r) forward and backward passes.
Character insertions and deletions are modeled as
multiple flips, but for simplicity, we only consider
character flips in our work.
The main drawbacks of HOTFLIP are that it
does not gain any knowledge from optimizing
over multiple examples, and that its efficiency is
strongly tied to the search procedure used (O(K ·
r) forward and backward passes per example for
beam-search). Next, we present our model that
overcomes these limitations.
4 Distilling a Black-box Attack
We are interested in whether (a) the knowledge in
the optimization process of HOTFLIP can be dis-
tilled into a neural model, and (b) whether this
model can generalize to a black-box attack. There-
fore, the outline of our approach is as follows:
1. Train a source text classification model on data
from a similar distribution to the data used to
train the target black-box model.
2. Generate adversarial examples by performing
white-box optimization (with HOTFLIP) on the
source model.
3. Train an efficient attacker to generate adversar-
ial examples, and perform a black-box attack
against the target model.
We assume a training set D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1
used to train a character-based source model S(·)
that takes a character sequence x as input, and re-
turns a distribution over the output space Y (de-
tails on the source model are in Section 5). We
now elaborate on the processes of data generation
and training of the attacker.
Data generation We take examples (x, y) from
D and run HOTFLIP with search until we obtain
an adversarial example x¯ such that the probability
of the gold label is low, that is, [S(x¯)]y < τ , where
[S(x¯)]y is the probability given by S(x¯) to y ∈ Y
and τ is a threshold (we use τ = 0.15).
Let s = ((x(0) = x), x(1), . . . , (x(l) = x¯)) be
the sequence of sentences generating x¯, where ev-
ery consecutive pair (x(i), x(i+1)) differs by a sin-
gle character: the character in position j(i) was
flipped to the character c(i). Our attacker is trained
from examples (x(i), (j(i), c(i))) generated from
every pair of consecutive sentences in s. For ex-
ample, if the sentence is the one-word sentence
“Asshole”, and after flipping one character it be-
comes “Assnole”, the example would be (“Ass-
hole”, (4, ‘n’)).
Model training Our attacker takes a character
sequence x as input and outputs a pair (j∗, c∗),
where j∗ ∈ [1, . . . ,m] is the position of the char-
acter to be flipped, and c∗ is the target character.
Figure 2 describes the architecture of our
model.
Our model embeds each character using a pre-
trained 300-dimensional character embedding1,
and then passes the character sequence through
a 1-layer bidirectional LSTM (Hochreiter and
Schmidhuber, 1997) with 512-dimensional hid-
den states. The BiLSTM hj hidden state in ev-
ery position are passed through two feed-forward
networks, one for replacement prediction (which
character to flip) and one for target prediction
(what target character to choose). The network
that perfoms replacement prediction has 2 hidden
layers of dimensions 100 and 50 with ReLU acti-
vations, and a single logit lj as output per position.
The output distribution over the sentence positions
is given by a softmax over all character positions.
At inference time j∗ is computed with an argmax
instead of a softmax.
1https://github.com/minimaxir/
char-embeddings/blob/master/glove.840B.
300d-char.txt
Figure 2: The architecture of our attacker network.
The network that produces target prediction has
two-hidden layers of dimensions 100 and 100 with
ReLU activations and outputs a vector of logits
vj ∈ R96 per position with a softmax layer, which
provides a distribution over the character vocabu-
lary. The target character c∗ is computed at infer-
ence time with an argmax over the target position
xj∗ .
Our loss function is simply the sum of two
cross-entropy terms: one for the gold position, and
one for the gold character in the gold position.
Running our model is more efficient that HOT-
FLIP and run-time is independent of the optimiza-
tion procedure. A forward pass in our model is
equivalent to 2 ·K steps in HOTFLIP with beam-
search. We show this leads to large practical
speed-ups in Section 5.
5 Experiments
We now empirically investigate whether our
method can be used to attack classifiers for detect-
ing “toxic” language on social media. Recently a
challenge by Alphabet aimed to improve labeling
of toxic comments that are rude and disrespect-
ful. Alphabet released a dataset2 of 160K com-
ments from Wikipedia discussions, and classified
each comment to six labels. We focus on the Toxic
label only, which represents 9.5% of the dataset.
We used the dataset to train the source model
S(·), which runs a 2-layer bidirectional GRU (Cho
et al., 2014) over the input x, and then uses an at-
tention (Bahdanau et al., 2015) pooling layer to
obtain a fixed dimensional vector for x. This vec-
tor is passed through a feed-forward layer to com-
pute the probability that x is toxic. The accuracy
of the source model is 96.5% AUC – comparable
2https://www.kaggle.com/c/
jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge/
data
to the top submissions in the challenge.
We used the 13,815 toxic-labeled sentences
from the training set to generate adversarial ex-
amples for training the attacker as described
above. Dataset generation depends on the search
procedure, and we experiment with 3 setups:
(a) HOTFLIP-5: beam-search with K=5, (b)
HOTFLIP-10: beam-search with K=10, and (C)
HOTFLIP+: a more expensive search procedure
that calls S(·) more frequently. We describe the
details of this procedure in Appendix A. Because
our attacker is independent of the search proce-
dure, inference time is not affected by the search
procedure at data generation time. This results in
three distilled models: DISTFLIP-5, DISTFLIP-
10, and DISTFLIP+.3
Attacking the source model We compare the
performance of DISTFLIP variants against HOT-
FLIP variant, including HOTFLIP-1 (K=1). We
also compare to a RANDOM baseline, which
chooses a position and target character randomly,
and to an ATTENTION baseline, which uses the at-
tention layer of S(·) to choose the character posi-
tion with maximum attention to flip, and selects a
target character randomly.
Table 1 summarizes our results. We report the
average number of flips required to change the pre-
diction of toxic sentences in the source model, the
slow-down per single character-flip, and the slow-
down per attack, which is computed by multiply-
ing slow-down per flip by the ratio of the num-
ber of flips required per attack. Because roughly
15% of the examples in the dataset mostly con-
tain repeated profanities that require many flips,
we also report the average number of flips for the
other 85% of the examples.
We observe that HOTFLIP+ requires the fewest
flips to change model prediction, but attacks are
very slow. The number of flips per attack for
DISTFLIP+ is comparable to HOTFLIP-5 and
HOTFLIP-10, but it achieves a speed-up of 19x-
39x. DISTFLIP-5 and DISTFLIP-10 require a few
more flips compared to DISTFLIP+. Overall at-
tack quality is high, with less than two flips neces-
sary for 85% of the examples for DISTFLIP+.
Figure 3 provides a more fine-grained view of
the results by showing the proportion of sentences
classified as toxic as a function of the number of
flips. Overall, the picture is similar to Table 1, with
3DISTFLIP-5 is trained on 64K generated examples,
DISTFLIP-10 on 62K examples, and DISTFLIP+ on 46K.
Figure 3: Proportion of sentences classified as toxic as a
function of the number of flips for all models on the test set.
DISTFLIP+ being comparable to HOTFLIP-10.
Attacking The Google Perspective API The
Google perspective API4 returns the probability
that a sentence is toxic, where probability > 0.7
is classified as toxic, < 0.3 is non-toxic, and oth-
erwise uncertain. The model itself is not publicly
available. We randomly selected 136 toxic exam-
ples from the validation set and attacked them with
DISTFLIP+ until the source model probability was
< 0.5.
We measured the toxicity probability before and
after our attack and found that the average toxic-
ity probability decreased from 0.9 to 0.67, with
an average of 5.0 flips per sentence. The label
is flipped from toxic to uncertain or non-toxic in
42% of these examples.
Human validation To validate that toxic sen-
tences remain toxic after our attack, we showed
5 independent annotators a total of 150 sentences
from three classes: toxic sentences, non-toxic
sentences, and attacked sentences (attacked by
DISTFLIP-5). The same annotator was never
shown a toxic sentence and its attacked counter-
part. We asked annotators whether sentences are
toxic, and measured average annotated toxicity.
We found that 89.8% of the toxic sentences
were annotated as toxic, compared to 87.6% in the
attacked toxic sentences. This shows that humans
clearly view the sentences as toxic, even after our
attack. Table 2 shows examples for sentences at-
tacked by DISTFLIP-10 and the change in toxicity
score according to The Google Perspective API.
6 Conclusion
In this work we present a general approach for
distilling the knowledge in any white-box attack
4https://www.perspectiveapi.com
DISTFLIP+ DISTFLIP-10 DISTFLIP-5 HOTFLIP+ HOTFLIP-10 HOTFLIP-5 HOTFLIP-1 RAND. ATT.
#flips 5.05 7.5 8.6 3.2 4.5 4.6 13.8 56.0 70.6
#flips for 85% 1.88 2.27 2.30 1.66 2.16 2.18 2.24 24.57 36.09
Flip slow-down 1x 1x 1x 168.8x 43.3x 21.3x 6.1x - -
Attack slow-down 1x 1.48x 1.7x 108x 38.6x 19.4x 16.7x - -
Table 1: Average number of flips to change the prediction of toxic sentences, average number of flips to change the prediction
for 85% of the examples that do not contain repeated profanities, slow-down per flip compared to DISTFLIP+, and slow-down
per sentence attack compared to DISTFLIP+. One character-flip using DISTFLIP takes 12ms on an Nvidia GTX1080Ti.
Original Adversarial Google score
decline=I don’t fucking think so decline=I don’t vucking think so 0.79→ 0.07
its an AP article you asshole, how is it not neutral??? its an AP article you assnole, how is it not neutral??? 0.96→ 0.48
I think the 1 million sales is total bullshit though. I think the 1 million sales is total bullshkt though. 0.79→ 0.07
do not know juden! silence is golden juden, now shut up. do not know juden! silence is golden juden, now xhjt up. 0.69→ 0.37
This article sucks . . woo woo wooooooo This article xuxks . . woo woo wooooooo 0.93→ 0.22
Also bring back the brendle article you piece of shit. Also bring back the brendle article you pkece of xhkt. 0.98→ 0.32
to be driven away and die to be driven away and dke 0.82→ 0.32
Table 2: Examples of sentences attacked by DISTFLIP-10 and The Google Perspective toxicity score before and after the
attack.
into a trained model. We show that this results in
substantial speed-up (19x-39x) while maintaining
comparable quality. Moreover, we show that our
attack transfers to a black-box setting: we expose
the vulnerability of The Google Perspective API,
and are able to change the prediction for 42% of
input toxic examples, while humans easily detect
that examples are still toxic.
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A Appendix: HotFlip+
Algorithm 1 describes the search procedure of HOTFLIP+. The main motivation behind this search
procedure is that HOTFLIP uses gradients to estimate the character-flip that maximally changes the pre-
dictions of a model, but this estimate is not guaranteed to be correct. In HOTFLIP+ we try to overcome
this limitation by performing pruning with gradients, and then actually evaluating a larger number of pos-
sible flips by running the source model on many possible flips. This makes the search procedure slower,
because we have to run the source model (forward pass) much more frequently. For this algorithm we
use beam size 3.
In Algorithm 1, the toxicity score of a sentence is the result of running it through the source model,
and the beam score is the first-order estimate described in Section 3.
Algorithm 1 HotFlip+
1: procedure HOTFLIP+(sentence)
2: beam← Initialize beam with the original sentence and its toxicity score.
3: while True do
4: bf, tox← Pop from the beam the flipped sentence with lowest toxicity, and its toxicity.
5: if tox < 0.5 then
6: break
7: create a new beam.
8: for every beam entry in the current beam do
9: compute all possible flipped sentences and their beam score (as in HOTFLIP).
10: for flip sent, flip score in flipped sentences do
11: min score← minimal beam score on the beam.
12: if flip score > min score then . Prune using beam score
13: tox← Compute the toxicity of flip sent with a forward pass.
14: max tox in beam← Pop from the new beam the maximal toxicity score.
15: if tox < max tox in beam then
16: push flip sent, flip score, tox to the new beam.
17: return bf
